

Sample Exam Questions

Version 2

Exam Details

The exam will be held on Wednesday 21 October during class. It will be administered by Curtis Sharp. You will arrive at 3:25pm, and the exam will begin at 3:30pm sharp. It will last 1 hour.

Sample Exam Questions

Multiple Choice

- If physicalism is true then:
 1. Everything with a mental property also has a physical property.
 2. There are no mental properties.
 3. Every possible world with the same physical properties as the actual world has the same mental properties as the actual world.
 4. Every mental property is identical with a physical property.
- If dualism is true then:
 1. Souls exist.
 2. Everything with a physical property also has a mental property.
 3. Every mental property is identical with a physical property.
 4. There are some worlds with the same physical properties as the actual world but different mental properties.
- Princess Elisabeth's objection to Descartes was:

1. The pineal gland does not cause all of our behaviour.
 2. Since causation requires physical interaction by contact, mental substances cannot cause behaviour.
 3. Since causation requires correlation, mental substances cannot cause behaviour.
 4. Since causation involves the action of force, mental substances cannot cause behaviour.
- If dispositional behaviourism is true then:
 1. Mental properties are identical with behavioural dispositions.
 2. Mental properties can be analysed in terms of actual behaviour.
 3. Physicalism is false.
 4. Mental states are identical with brain states.
 - Dispositional behaviourism improves upon naïve behaviourism because:
 1. Linguistic behaviour cannot be characterised non-intentionally.
 2. Dispositional behaviourism is compatible with dualism.
 3. Mental states are multiply realisable.
 4. Not all mental states are actually expressed in behaviour.
 - Putnam's super-spartans are supposed to show that:
 1. No one in pain can perfectly pretend not to be in pain.
 2. If you act as if you are in pain, then you are in pain.
 3. We have no grounds for believing that a person is in pain if they do not act as humans do when in pain.
 4. A person may be in pain but not act as though they are in pain.
 - If the identity theory is true then:
 1. Mental states do not cause behaviour.
 2. Mental states are identical with behavioural dispositions.
 3. Mental states are identical with brain states.
 4. Physicalism is false.

Short Answer

- What is the problem of the mark of the mental? Explain and evaluate the proposal that intentionality is the mark of the mental.
- Evaluate the following argument for dualism:
 1. I am such that my existence cannot be doubted.
 2. My body is not such that its existence cannot be doubted.
 3. Therefore, I am not identical with my body.
- Explain the pairing problem for substance dualism, and evaluate whether the problem is solved by the identity theory.
- Explain and evaluate dispositional behaviourism. In your response, discuss at least two of the following objections to behaviourism:
 - The translation problem.
 - The problem of mental causation.
 - The super-spartan problem.
 - The Blockhead problem.
 - The problem of the difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds.
- Explain and evaluate the identity theory. In your response, discuss at least two of the following objections to the identity theory:
 - People knew about mental states before they knew about brain states.
 - It doesn't make sense to say that mental states are located in the brain.
 - Mental states are multiply realisable.
 - The identity theory does not explain correlations between mental and physical properties, because properties must be distinct in order to be correlated.
- Explain how the identity theory solves two of the following problems for dispositional behaviourism:
 - The translation problem.
 - The problem of mental causation.
 - The super-spartan problem.
 - The Blockhead problem.

- The problem of the difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds.
- Lewis (1966) gives an argument for the identity theory that he claims does not require an appeal to simplicity. Explain and evaluate the argument.
- Lewis (1980) describes two kinds of pain, and uses them to raise a problem and motivate a solution to the problem. Discuss this argument, addressing the following questions:
 - What are the two kinds of pain?
 - How do they make problems for dispositional behaviourism?
 - How do they make problems for a form of identity theory that identifies pain with a specific neural state?
 - What is Lewis' solution to the problems?

References

- Lewis, David. 1966. "An Argument for the Identity Theory", in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 1966, pp. 17–25.
- . 1980. "Mad Pain and Martian Pain", in Ned Block (Ed.), *Readings in Philosophy of Psychology*, Volume 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 216–222. Reprinted with postscript in Lewis (1983, pp. 122–132). URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195032047.003.0009>.
- . 1983. *Philosophical Papers*, Volume I, Oxford University Press, Oxford. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195032047.001.0001>.