

Philosophy of Mind: Essay One

Requirements

You are to submit one 8–10 page research paper on Thursday 6 March, addressing one and only one of the questions listed below. A hard copy of the paper must be submitted in class.

Guidelines

Essay guidelines are available here: <http://goo.gl/jrx25>

Questions

- State the thesis of *physicalism*, distinguishing between the *completeness question* and the *condition question* (Stoljar 2009). State *Hempel's Dilemma*, and explain and evaluate one response to the dilemma (Ney 2008).
- Explain the *pairing problem* for substance dualism (Kim 2010, pp. 50–53). Explain and evaluate one response to the problem.
- State the *identity theory*. Explain and evaluate the argument for the identity theory given by either Smart (1959) or Lewis (1966). Explain and evaluate one objection to the identity theory.
- Lewis (1980) argues that a theory of mind should accommodate the possibility of both *mad pain* and *martian pain*. Define mad pain and martian pain, and explain and evaluate the form of identity theory that Lewis proposes to accommodate them.
- Searle (1980) argues that instantiating a computer program is never sufficient for the existence of intentional states. Explain and evaluate his argument.

References

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- Daniel Stoljar. 2009. “Physicalism”, in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Stanford University, Stanford. URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/>.