

Essay Two

Requirements

You are to submit one 5-7 page research paper on Monday 13 December, addressing one and only one of the questions listed below. A hard copy of the paper must be submitted in class.

Guidelines

An excellent resource to read before starting your essay is James Pryor's "[Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper](#)". You might also find his "[Philosophical Terms and Methods](#)" and "[How To Read a Philosophy Paper](#)" useful.

Questions

Note: I will accept papers on other topics we have covered, provided you have submitted a paper outline and have received permission to write the associated paper.

- Explain and evaluate the Lewis view of laws of nature, addressing the following questions (Psillos 2002):
 - How does the Lewis view improve on the basic regularity view of laws?
 - How does the Lewis view allow for uninstantiated laws?
- Explain and evaluate the arguments involving thought-experiments purporting to show that the laws could vary independently of the pattern of individual events (Beebe 2000; Carroll 1990).

- Explain and evaluate Fodor’s argument against reductivism and explain his non-reductivist physicalism, addressing at least two of the following questions (Fodor 1974):
 - Why does Fodor think it obvious that there will not always be bridge principles of the kind required by reductivism? Illustrate by way of an example.
 - Explain and evaluate Fodor’s argument that reductivism has a problem with special science laws that have exceptions.
 - Explain and evaluate Fodor’s argument that neither bridge laws nor proper laws involving disjunctions of physical kinds are themselves laws.
 - Explain and evaluate Loewer’s argument against Fodor that a world metaphysically lacking special science kinds and laws would lack nothing scientifically important (Loewer 2009).

References

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- Carroll, John W. 1990. “The Humean Tradition,” in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 99, No. 2, April 1990, pp. 185–219. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185489>.
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